

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN

TO SECSTATE 331

INFO AMEMBASSY TEHERAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 5161

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GE, IR,XE

SUBJECT: IRANIAN AMBASSADOR'S COMMENTS ON MIDDLE EAST

1. ON JANUARY 28 THE AMBASSADOR OF IRAN, FEREYDOUN FARROKH, CALLED ON ME.

2. HE IMMEDIATELY OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY ASKING IF THE U.S. CONSIDERED THERE WAS ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE UPSURGE OF FIGHTING IN VIETNAM AND THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. I SAID THAT I KNEW OF NONE AND ASKED HIS REASON FOR THE QUESTION. HE RESPONDED THAT IT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A WARNING OF A HARDER SOVIET POSITION THAT THE MID-EAST PROBLEM BE SETTLED, AND THAT IRAN WAS CONCERNED.

2. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR IRAN TO COLLABORATE WITH OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, IT DID NOT ADHERE TO ALL ARAB POSITIONS AND HAD MAINTAINED AND WOULD MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. HE HAD STATED THE SAME POSITION OF FRIENDSHIP WHEN I CALLED ON HIM ON JANUARY 13. HE TOLD ME AT THAT TIME THE SHAH HAD INFORMED SADAT IRAN WOULD NOT ENGAGE IN
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ANOTHER OIL EMBARGO.

3. I ASKED HIM FOR HIS VIEWS ON THE MID-EAST. HE RESPONDED THAT SADAT WAS THE CHIEF AGENT OF RESTRAINT, HE WAS CLOSE TO OUR SECRETARY OF STATE, AND HE GENUINELY WANTED TO DEVELOPE CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE BELIEVED THAT THE SUPPLY OF ARMS SADAT NEEDED WOULD NOT DEVELOP FROM THE SOVIETS, UNLESS SADAT WOULD ACCEPT THE RETURN OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS WHICH SADAT WOULD NOT ACCEPT OTHER THAN AS AN EMERGENCY MEASURE.

4. HE SAID THAT SADAT COULD NOT NOW MAKE A SEPARATE SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL AS MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE BEFORE, AS RABAT, RECOGNITION OF THE PLO AND SUPPORT BY THE ARAB OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES, HAD INTERVENED. HE MENTIONED THAT SADAT HAD TO BE CAREFUL ABOUT OPINION IN EGYPT, AS THERE WERE MANY SOVIET ADHERENTS AND PERSONAL ENEMIES WHO COULD CAUSE HIM TROUBLE.

5. CONCERNING MY INQUIRY HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO SECURE A STEP BY STEP SETTLEMENT IF SADAT AND OTHERS WERE PERSUADED THE PROCESS WOULD LEAD IN REASONABLE TIME TO THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION REQUIRED BY ARAB NATIONS - WITHDRAWAL TO ORIGINAL BORDERS, HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE VISIT OF GROMYKO TO CAIRO, HOPEFUL ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, THINKING TIME HAD COME FOR SPECIFICS ON SETTLEMENT. CONTRARY TO VIEW OF MOSTAFA TAWFIK, AMBASSADOR OF EGYPT TO GDR, WHICH I REPORTED IN (BERLIN 5129) HE CONSIDERS RABIN A MAN OF REASON WHO MIGHT BE ABLE TO LEAD ISRAEL TO SETTLEMENT.

6. FARROKH DOES NOT BELIEVE SOVIET UNION WOULD INTERVENE WITH MILITARY FORCES IN MIDDLE EAST, HIS REASON BEING THAT THEY UNDERSTAND CONSEQUENCES OF A POSSIBLE NUCLEAR WAR. HE EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN GENEVA TALKS. HE CONSIDERED U.S. AS THE CHIEF AGENT OF SETTLEMENT, AND THAT AS SUCH IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT U.S. MAINTAIN ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN MEDITERRANEAN, INDIAN OCEAN, AND PERSIAN GULF, NOTING APPROVAL OF REPORTED LEASE

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BY U.S. OF BRITISH FACILITY.

7. IN ADDITION TO SUPREME EFFORT BY THE SECRETARY AND THE MAINTENANCE OF U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE, HIS CONCRETE SUGGESTIONS WERE THAT U.S. SHOULD TALK TO PLO (HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY SAY "RECOGNIZE") THAT ISRAEL MUST ACCEPT PLO IN NEGOTIATIONS AS PLO IS A FACT, AND THAT ISRAELI LEADERS SHOULD CONVINCE NON-ISRAELI

ZIONISTS, CHIEFLY IN U.S. (WHOM HE CHARACTERIZED AS NOT PERSONALLY FACED WITH WAR, AND UNWILLING TO RECOGNIZE THE POSSIBLE EXTINCTION OF ISRAEL AS A STATE) THAT A SETTLEMENT IS IMPERATIVE.

8. HE CONSIDERS THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS USING GDR CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SINDERMAN, IN HIS VISITS TO KUWAIT AND IRAQ, TO CAUSE TROUBLE.COOPER

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